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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
RUSSIA'S OFFSHORE OIL & GAS
INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM MARKET
Deborah K. Espinosat
Abstract: Due to Northeast Asia's increasing energy demand, the Russian Far
East's immense oil and gas reserves, and the close physical proximity between the two
regions, international petroleum companies are exploring Russia's offshore petroleum
reserves in the Far East. The Russian offshore industry, however, presents foreign
investors with many legal uncertainties including exposure to environmental liabilities.
This Comment suggests that Russia's environmental regulatory system, which includes a
constitutional right to a healthy environment, presents international petroleum companies
with a new set of circumstances to which they must adapt if Russian reserves are to
satisfy Northeast Asia's rising energy needs. To do otherwise would be to expose
themselves to greater liability in an already risky investment climate.

I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant events in the evolution of the
international oil and gas market' is the entrance into the market of the
petroleum-producing countries of the former Soviet Union.2 With the
enactment of the long-awaited Russian Federation Law on Production
Sharing Agreements ("PSA"), 3 Russia has joined the club of petroleumproducing countries which contracts out to international oil and gas
consortia the rights to explore and exploit its energy resources.4 In so
I B.A., History (University of California, Berkeley), M.A. (Russian, East European & Central Asian
Studies, University of Washington).
' See, e.g., Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum
Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 13 (1989).
2 The petroleum-producing countries of the former Soviet Union include the Russian Federation,
Kazakstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. The impact of these transitional economies' entry into the
world petroleum market has recently been considered. See Thomas W. Wtilde, InternationalEnergy
Investment, 17 ENERGY L.J. 191 (1996) (discussing how petroleum countries in transition may force
petroleum legislation and contracting to evolve).
" Law on Production Sharing Agreements, No. 225-3, ECONoMIc LAW OF RUSSIA, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File [hereinafter PSA Law].
" Petroleum-producing countries often lack the capital and technology necessary to develop the
resources themselves. PSAs represent considerable value to such countries. See, e.g., Sola Adepetun,
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doing, Russia moved one step closer to participating in the Northeast Asian
energy market.
There has never been a better time than the present to export Russian
energy resources to Northeast Asia. As economies of Northeast Asia
continue to expand,5 so too do these countries' energy needs.6 To date,
regional demand for oil and natural gas exceeds regional supply.7 The
region is considered to be at "an energy crossroads" in that it must decide
whether to cooperate to exploit its own energy resources or continue to
depend on far away markets.
As one commentator characterized the
energy situation in the region, "Virtually all foreseeable futures pose
unsettling dilemmas for Asia."9
Russia is particularly well-situated to meet Northeast Asia's energy
needs. Russia possesses the largest supply of natural gas in the world and a
significant portion of global oil reserves.'I Much of these resources lie in
the Russian Far East ("RFE"), an area which shares a border with China and
North Korea and at one point lies only fifty miles from Japan. And yet, the
RFE's capacity to supply its energy-hungry neighbors is constrained in part
by its legal system.
The legal obstacles to foreign investment in the Russian oil and gas
sector are substantial." Analysts characterize the situation as "a disaster for
investors."12 And, "The severity of the tax burden is rivaled only by the
frequency and unpredictability with which it changes."' 3 Other related
problems include constantly changing export duties and overlapping
ProductionSharing Contracts-TheNigerianExperience, 13 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L., 21, 21-22
(1995).
KEUN-WOOK PAIK, GAS AND OIL IN NORTHEAST ASIA 3 (1995)

Id at4-5.
Id. at 5. Estimates indicate that in the next decade, Asia will consume more oil than that which
North America consumes. Joseph Stanislaw & Daniel Yergin, Oil: Reopening the Door, 72 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 81, 90 (1993).
' NE Asia 'at Crossroads'-RussianGas Beckons, INT'L GAS REP., Feb. 16, 1996, available in
1996 WL 8731199. Between 1990-92, Middle Eastern oil comprised 72-75 percent of Japanese energy
consumption, 74-75 percent of South Korean, and 79-80 percent of Taiwanese. PAIK, supra note 5,at 6.
Kent E. Calder, Asia's Empty Tank, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 55, 56 (1996).
"0 The former Soviet Union is reputed to have the third largest proven oil reserves in the world after
the Middle East and Venezuela. Rushing In and Out of Russia, ENERGY ECONOMIST, July 1995, available
in LEXIS, Energy Library, ALLNWS File.
" Foreign investment is considered an essential requirement to Russia exploiting its oil and gas
resources, particularly offshore. See, e.g., Stanislaw & Yergin, supra note 7, at 86-87.
2 Vladimir Khrenov & John Sheedy, Production Sharing in Russia: Investors Share Hope,
PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, May 1996, at 83.
13 Id See also Judith Robinson, Russian Oil and the
Tax Dilemma, TAX NOTES INT'L, Nov. 6, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNI File.
6
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jurisdiction between federal, regional, and local authorities.' 4 An additional
complicating factor which has been little analyzed is the legal uncertainties
5
which Russian environmental law presents foreign investors.
In traditional petroleum-producing countries, uncertainty as to
environmental obligations and potential liabilities has not operated as a
disincentive to investment.' 6 The overwhelming majority of petroleumproducing countries neglect the environmental aspects of energy resource
development. 7 In order to attract international petroleum companies,

countries typically choose not to enact strict environmental requirements. 8
The situation in the Russian Federation is somewhat different. Russia, as
one of the successor states of the Soviet Union, inherited an extensive legal
framework for environmental protection. That framework, however, creates
broad and ambiguous duties which, thus far, have been erratically enforced.
This Comment begins by describing the RFE's physical capacity to
meet the energy needs of Northeast Asia. The section includes a historical

account of efforts to exploit the offshore oil and gas reserves in the region.
Part III briefly recounts Soviet environmental law and policy. Part IV
surveys the current legal framework for exploitation of offshore energy

resources. The need for environmental regulation of offshore exploration
and exploitation activities is examined in Part V by looking at its
environmental impacts.' 9 Part VI analyzes the environmental obligations of
prospective mineral developers during the three stages of an offshore

project. This Comment concludes that because of Russia's fairly advanced
"4 See, e.g., Chris Ferguson, Safeguarding Against Unexpected Local Taxes, EAST/WEST
COMMERSANT, Nov. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File (discussing the
"Krasnodar case" where a conflict arose between federal and local authorities over tax ievenues).
" See, e.g., John Kingston, Environmental Rules Adding to the Burdens in Russia, PLATr'S
OILGRAM NEWS, Sept. 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, PONEWS File. See also Nicholas
A. Robinson, Environmental ProtectionLegislation in Russia's Oil and Gas Industry, in INTERNATIONAL
OIL AND GAS INVESTMENT: MOVING EASTWARD? 253 (Thomas W. Wkilde & George K. Ndi eds., 1994)
(suggesting necessary environmental protection legislation).
6 For example, Indonesia and the Gulf states have few environmental restrictions on offshore oil
and gas activities. ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS AND NEW
DIRECTIONS 96-99 (1994); MARIA GAVOUNELI, POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS 136-139
(1995).
"7 Zhiguo Gao, International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: A
Comprehensive Environmental Appraisal, 12 J. ENER. & NAT. RESOURCES. L. 240 (1994).
Not
surprisingly then, there is a dearth of legal scholarship on the issue. Id. at 240-41.
"

Id. at 250.

9 This Comment is limited to discussing regulation of pollution from sea-bed activites. Regulation
of pollution from land-based development, dumping, and vessels is beyond the scope of this study. These
classifications, although artificial because these activities have a cumulative impact, are common.
GAVOUNELI, supra note 16, at 36.
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environmental regulatory structure (albeit unenforced so far), Russia
presents international petroleum companies with a new set of circumstances
to which they must adapt if they want to participate in the "new Middle
East."2 As the rule of law takes hold in Russia and other petroleumproducing transitional economies, however, the oil and gas industry would
be well-advised to adopt industry-wide environmentally-sound development
practices. The alternative is exposure to uncertain and increasing liability as
Russia's legal regime matures.
II.

THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

A.

GeographicProfile of the Russian FarEast

The RFE shares a 2200 km (1342 mile) border with China, much of it
along the Amur River. 2' The region also borders Mongolia, North Korea,
the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Pacific Ocean, and the Arctic seas
of East Siberia and the Laptev. The Japanese island of Hokkaido lies a
mere eighty kilometers (fifty miles) from the tip of Sakhalin Island.22 Some
9216 km (5620 miles) to the east across Siberia and the Ural mountains is
23
Moscow.

The RFE comprises thirty-six percent of the Russian Federation's
land mass, or roughly three-quarters the size of the contiguous United
States.24 The Khabarovsk Krai alone is 1.5 times larger than France. 25 The
RFE is a group of eleven territories with no collective political authority.
These territories include: the Republic of Sakha (also known as YakutSakha); Primorskii Krai (or the Maritime Province); Khabarovsk Krai; the
Magadan, Amur, Sakhalin and Kamchatka Oblasts; and the Jewish, Koryak,
20 Lynnley Browning, Russia Moves to Stifle Oil Market Fears, LLOYD'S LIST, Nov. 1, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File. "Someday, Russia's Barents and Kara Sea provinces
and its Okhotsk Sea province north of Japan will probably replace both the Gulf of Mexico and the North

Sea as the world's big offshore petroleum plays for the first half of the 21st century."

Dev George,

Revival!, OFFSHORE, May 1996, at 32.
21 ELISA MILLER & ALEXANDER

KARP, POCKET HANDBOOK

OF THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST:

A

REFERENCE GUIDE 3 (1994).
22 Matthew J.Sagers, Prospectsfor Oil and Gas Development in Russia'sSakhalin Oblast, 36 POSTSOVIET GEOGRAPHY 274, 275 (1995).
23 MILLER & KARP, supra note 21, at 3.
24 Holly Strand, The Russian Far East, in ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES AND CONSTRAINTS INTHE

FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS 79, 79 (Phillip R. Pryde ed., 1995).
21 MILLER & KARP, supra note 21, at 3.
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and Chukotsk Autonomous Republics. 26 All but one of the territories have
equal status in the Russian Federation; the Republic of Sakha enjoys greater
27
autonomy.
The region is one of the least developed areas of the Russian
2
2
Federation. Only eight million people reside on 6,215,900 km of land. 1
The RFE economy relies heavily on extractive industries. 29 The region
produces almost all of the nation's diamonds and tin and more than half of
its gold and fish products. 30 The RFE's energy sector is comprised of oil,
3
natural gas, coal, and nuclear power generation. 1
B.

Oil & Gas Resources in the Russian FarEast

Five years ago, Russia was the world's largest oil producer.32 In his
Pulitzer Prize-winning book, author Daniel Yergin speculated that Soviet
exports could become more crucial to world markets than they already
were. 33 Backing up this claim is the RFE's 339 million metric tons (308.2
million tons) of industrial-grade oil. 34 Approximately sixty percent of the
region's oil reserves are on land, and the remainder lie on the adjoining
continental shelf off Sakhalin Island in the Sea of Okhotsk.35 Currently, all
oil and gas production in the region is onshore.
Russia is also the world's largest natural gas producer, generating
approximately 2.1 billion cubic meters (76 billion cubic feet) of gas per
day.3 6 The RFE possesses 1.5 trillion cubic meters of confirmed reserves. 37
The Republic of Sakha, Sakhalin Oblast, and Kamchatka and Magadan hold

26

Strand, supranote 24, at 79.

27 For example, republics have the right to establish their own state languages. Constitution of the

Russian Federation, art. 68.2, ECONOMIC LAW OF RUSSIA, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW
File [hereinafter KONST. RF].
2" Strand, supra note 24, at 79.
29 MILLER & KARP, supranote 2 1, at 2.
30 Id at 2.
3'Id.at 108.
32 Stanislaw & Yergin, supra note 7, at 85.
DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 774 (1991).

SA.S. Sheingauz, Natural Resources Potential, in THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST: AN ECONOMIC
HANDBOOK 16 (Pavel A. Minakir & Gregory L. Freeze eds., 1994).
"' ld Onshore deposits are located on Sakhalin Island, thirty-eight percent in the Republic of Sakha
and one percent in the Magadan Oblast. Id
36 James W. Skeleton, Jr., Investing in Russia's Oil and Gas Industry: The Legal and Bureaucratic
Obstacles, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 26, 26 (1993).
" Sheingauz, supranote 34, at 16.
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fifty-nine, forty, and one percent of the gas, respectively. 3 Actual reserves
are expected to far exceed known quantities.39 One estimate indicates 24.2
40
trillion cubic meters of potential natural gas reserves.
The area's huge energy resources and proximity to Far Eastern
markets constitute the main attractions to foreign oil companies. 4I These
factors are expected to open up new markets for Russian oil and gas in the
42
Pacific Rim.
1.

HistoricalInterest in the RFE's Offshore Oil and Gas

Onshore commercial production of Sakhalin's petroleum resources
began in 1921 when the island was under Japanese occupation.43 Offshore
activities began in 1957." Petroleum was first discovered on the northeast
shelf of Sakhalin Island in the Sakhalin Gulf, the Tatarskii Strait and the
southwest portion of Sakhalin.45 By 1967, five fields had been discovered
with twenty-eight oil wells and drilling was underway in fifty-one new
areas. 46 By 1970, production onshore was showing signs of strain. 47 As a
consequence, and given the highly technical nature of extracting petroleum
from Sakhalin's continental shelf,48 the Soviets decided to enlist the
cooperation of foreign firms.49
Soviet-Japanese negotiations to develop Sakhalin's offshore
resources were prompted by two additional factors: a downturn in
production due to the Soviet's aging technology and Japan's energy needs
on the eve of the OPEC oil crisis.5" In 1975, after several years of tense
negotiations, the Soviet Union and the Japanese consortium Sodeco (three
percent of which was owned by the U.S. firm Gulf Oil) agreed to the joint
exploration of Sakhalin's continental shelf. 5' Gulf Oil was to provide
38

Id

39 Id

40 KEUN-WOOK PAIK, supra note 5, at 82.
4' Green Lightfor Sakhalin-2 as ForeignInvestment Starts Moving Ahead, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST,

July, I, 1996, at 48, 48.
42 id
43 STEPHEN LEWARNE, SOVIET OIL: THE MOVE OFFSHORE 83 (1988).
" Sagers, supra note 22, at 277.
4' LEWARNE, supra note 43, at 81.

SId at 83.
47 Id

For example, from mid-September to mid-May ice floes permeate the Sea of Okhotsk. Id at 84.
4 See ld. at 83.
Id. at 84.
"
Id. at 85-88.
48
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technology and capital for the new consortium.5 2 Throughout the life of the
agreement, the Soviets tried to acquire foreign technology and training, both
Japanese and American, while at the same time minimizing foreign
participation; such dependence left the Soviet Union uncomfortable. 3
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sounded the death knell for
the development of Sakhalin's offshore deposits.54 In response to the
invasion, the U.S. imposed a series of sanctions, which, when combined
with plummeting world oil prices in the mid-1980s, effectively terminated
foreign cooperation in Soviet offshore activities.55 Without American
technology, characterized as "intrinsic to Japan's success in the region," the
Soviet Union discontinued developing in the region. 6
2.

CurrentProjects/Proposals

Russia's transition to a market economy 57 has had a substantial effect
on its oil and gas industry in that it now produces barely over a quarter of its
Soviet production levels. 58 As one of the world's largest producers of oil
and natural gas, Russia derives sixty-nine percent of its federal budget from
the energy sector. 59 Although Russia has significant onshore petroleum
reserves, V.P. Shcherbakov of the Russian Federation Committee on
Geology and Use of Mineral Resources notes that "future development of
the Russian petroleum industry will be connected with offshore
hydrocarbon resources. ' 60 According to Mr. Shcherbakov, Russia's
"primary task" is the creation of a petroleum industry with up to 20.9 metric
tons (twenty-three million tons) of oil per year extracted from Sakhalin
Island's northeast shores. 61 A proposed undersea pipeline from Sakhalin to
Hokkaido, Japan could provide fuel for "energy-starved Japan.,
52

62

Another

Id at 87.

SId. at 92.
14

Id at 94.

s5 Id

Id
17 See, e.g., MAXIM BOYCKO ET AL., PRIVATIZING RUSSIA (1995).
5 V.P. Shcherbakov, Russian Market Reforms to Speed Development of Offshore Resources,
OFFSHORE, Oct. 1996, at 92.
59 Mixed Emotions, RUSSIAN PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Nov. 1996, at 12. See, e.g., Matthew J. Sagers,
The Russian NaturalGas Industry in the Mid-1990s, 36 POST-SOVIET GEOGRAPHY 521 (1995) (discussing
the opportunities and constraints facing Russia's natural gas industry).
6 Shcherbakov, supra note 58, at 92.
61 Id
62 Vijai Maheshwari, A Sleepy IslandAwaits a Gusher... And Japan Gets in on the Action, BUS.
56

WK, Jan. 27, 1997, at4.
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proposal in the works is for a 1700 mile (2736 km) pipeline between Russia
and a site near Tokyo.63
Four major development projects are either underway or proposed off
Sakhalin Island. Sakhalin-I is a $15 billion project involving an American
company, a Japanese company, and two Russian partners. First negotiated
in 1988, 64 the international consortium is now comprised of Exxon Neftegas
(30%), Japan's Sodeco (30%) Sakhalinmor-neftegas-Shelf (23%), and
Rosneft-Sakhalin (17%).65 The production sharing agreement has been
approved,66 exploratory drilling was completed in the summer of 1996,67
and oil and gas are expected to start flowing in six to nine years.68 An
estimated 424 billion cubic meters of gas and 2.4 billion barrels of oil are
recoverable from these fields.69
Sakhalin-II is also valued at $15 billion.7" Two fields off the coast of
Sakhalin, Piltun-Astokhskoy and Lunskoye, are being developed by
Sakhalin Energy Investment, a joint-venture comprised of Marathon (30%),
Mitsui (20%), McDermott (20%), Shell (20%), and Mitsubishi (10%).7
The first oil and gas could flow from this field by early 2002.72 Combined
reserves in the area are expected to amount to 750 million barrels of oil and
494 billion cubic meters of gas." The production sharing agreement has
been approved,74 and the appraisal phase began in June 1996. 75 Oil and gas
from these fields will flow to Sakhalin's onshore production facility.7 6
After processing, the oil and gas will move 625 km to the liquefied natural
gas ("LNG") plant and oil export terminal at Prigorodnoye.77 Conventional
63 Pipelines,OIL & GAS J., Dec. 9, 1996 at 37.
64 PAIK, supranote 5, at 214.
61 lain Esau, Sakhalin Platform Deal for Kvaerner, LLOYD'S LIST, Jan. 21, 1997, available
in
LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File.
Campaign '96, RUSSIAN PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Nov. 1996, at l1. For an explanation of Russia's
production sharing agreements, see discussion infra part IV.C.
67 Maheshwari, supra note 62, at 4.
6
Neil Potter, Investors Gear Up for Sakhalin Projects, LLOYD'S LIST, Apr. 4, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, TXTNWS File. There are three fields on the northeast shelf: Odoptu (discovered
in 1977), Chayvo (discovered in 1979), and Arkutun-Dagi (discovered in 1989). Id
69 Id

7 Imbert Matthee, On the Cusp of a New Oil, Gas Boom Seattle Could Prosperfrom Russia's
Venture, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 6, 1996, at Al.
"' Potter, supra note 68.
72 Id.

7

Green Light, supranote 41, at 48.
Campaign '96, supra note 66, at 9, II.
7 Maheshwari, supra note 62, at 4.
76 Potter, supranote
68.
77 Id
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tankers are expected to export the oil and gas 78 to markets in Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan.79
Sakhalin-III, which allocates rights to the East Odoptu and Ayashsky
fields and the Kirinsky block, was awarded to the Mobil/Texaco
consortium.8" The volume of Sakhalin-III's reserves has not yet been
disclosed.8' In terms of the federal government's development priorities,
the Sakhalin-III project made the proverbial "short list" in October 1996.2
It appears that two separate production sharing agreements are "in the
works."

3

The Sakhalin-IV tender was announced in the fall of 1994.4 This
project is located northwest of Sakhalin Island in Sakhalin Bay.85 The three

areas up for tender are estimated to contain 200 million metric tons of oil

86
and sixty to seventy billion cubic meters of natural gas.

III.

SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY

Before discussing Russia's environmental legislation, a review of
.Soviet environmental law and policy is included in order to make clear the

historical context from which Russian environmental law has emerged and
the enduring consequences of that history. This policy is best summed up
by Alexei Yablokov, former Minister of the Environment under President
Yeltsin, "We had a slogan--'The plan is the law.'

'8 7

9 Robert Corzine, Russia Energy Deals GatherPace, FIN. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at 4.
'o Robert DiNardo, Mobil, Texaco Finish Up Kirinskiy Talks, But with Much Left to be Decided,
PLAT-r's OILGRAM NEWS, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, PONEWS File.
" Alexander Karetin, Sakhalin Oil Could Define Alaska-Russian Far East Ventures, 20 ALASKA J.
COMMERCE I1,11 (1996).
Campaign '96, supra note 66, at 10.
Jane Upperton, Rosneft Targets Bigger Stake in Sakhalin, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Oct. II,
1996, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, PONEWS File.
14 Jack Holton, Sakhalin-Giant Reserves and Hungry Markets,
PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Sept.
1995, at 16, 16.
"s The Four Sakhlin Ventures, APS REVIEW GAS MARKET TRENDS, Sept. 19, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, PROMT File.
:6 Sagers, supranote 22, at 286.
7 Robyn Dixon, Russia: Scum ofthe Earth-EnvironmentalPollution," THE AGE (Melb.), Nov. 26,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File. The "plan" refers to the Soviet Union's national
Five-Year economic plans to increase industrial and agricultural production. Governmental bureaucrats set
detailed and ambitious production quotas for each product (e.g., in 1980, 435 million cubic meters of gas
and 168 million tons of steel were planned). ALEC NOVE, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE U.S.S.R. 377
(1982). At one time the national plan had 60,000 separate headings. A.G. AGANBEGIAN, INSIDE
PERESTROIKA: THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY 91 (1989). Quotas were then divided by the number
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Imagine the United States without the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Greenpeace. Envision
a chemical company drafting the Clean Water Act and a timber company

enforcing the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. That picture is, in
effect, what was once the environmental policy of the Soviet Union. For
approximately

seventy years, the government of the U.S.S.R.

acted

simultaneously as legislator, enforcer, violator, and adjudicator. Producers
were rewarded for output regardless of economic or social costs. That
policy, combined with a prohibition on public participation, left the lands of
the former Soviet Union poisoned, her resources depleted, and her citizens
ill.8"
One would naturally assume that in a society with state indifference
to the environment, legislation regulating Soviet industries must have been
minimal if not non-existent. Such is not the case. Rather, the Soviet Union
established one of the most advanced regulatory structures on the planet
encompassing restrictions on the use of land, water, air, minerals, forests,
and the animal world.8 9 Most enterprises of economic or military

significance, however, were defacto exempt from complying with the law.90
Regulations were routinely ignored in order to fulfill the plan. 9' The
ecological consequences of routine circumvention of state authority are only
now beginning to be known.
At the heart of this paradox, in which the state created a system to
regulate its own use of natural resources while at the same time boldly

ignoring them, is the policy of state ownership. That is, the government
of enterprises (to an extent taking into consideration its capital and labor capacity) to calculate each
enterprise's quota. Early in Soviet history, failure to meet individual plans resulted in harsh consequences.
See, e.g., ROBERT CONQUEST, HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE TERROR FAMINE
(1986).
" For two excellent accounts of the impact of Soviet policy on the environment and public health,
see MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR (1992); D.J. PETERSON,
TROUBLED LANDS (1994).
"9 By 1985, approximately 670 federal environmental laws were listed in Volume IV of the USSR
Code of Laws. Zigurds L. Zile, Implementation of Environmental Law in the USSR, in SOVIET
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THEORY AND POLICY 262 (G. Ginsburgs et al. eds., 1989). For analyses of Soviet
environmental law, see infra notes 90, 94, and O.S. Kolbasov, The Concept of Ecological Law, 4 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 267 (1989); Peter B. Maggs, Marxism and Soviet Environmental Law, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 353 (1985); Nicholas Robinson, Perestroikaand Priroda:Environmental Protection in the USSR, 5
PACE ENVT'L L.R. 351 (1989).
'
Peter M. Langrind, An Overview of Environmental Law in the USSR, II N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 483, 486 (1990); Nicholas A. Robinson, Pollution Controls Developing in Ex-US.SR., NAT'L L.
J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 27.
9" Langrind, supra note 90, at 486-87.
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owned all means of production, including land.92 Significantly, as owner,
the state was the sole benefactor of all legitimate economic activity. 93 As a
consequence, the state's interests in generating revenue far exceeded those
of complying with its own environmental regulations.
Despite efforts to reform the legal system in the late 1980s, 94 lack of
enforcement persisted. 95 Legislative improvements were passed in vain due
to the difficulties of enforcement and adjudication, "[E]nforcement agencies
continued to lack adequate staff, independence, and authority to sanction
offenders. Furthermore, the Soviet court system was not equipped to punish
96
violators of the environmental laws or to make major policy decisions."
Ultimately, the interests of the state property regime fundamentally
conflicted with its own restrictions for the prevention of environmental
degradation.
Today, as the Russian Federation continues its journey
towards a "market-oriented" economy, replete with consumer products,
foreign investment, and private property, many of the former rights and
responsibilities of the government are being shifted to the private sector.
IV.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLOITING OIL AND GAS RESOURCES

A.

Law on UndergroundResources

The 1992 Law on Underground Resources establishes the regulatory
framework for the exploration, utilization, and conservation of the Russian
Federation's underground natural resources within its territories and on its
continental shelf.97 The primary goal of the law is to ensure the sustainable
development of the subsoil resources, "The main objective of state
regulation of the use of underground resources shall be ensuring
replacement of the mineral raw materials base, its rational use and
'
JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 71 (1992).
93 Id.

" Elena Kirillova, EnvironmentalLaw in the New Soviet Union, 14 INT'L ENVT. REP. CURRENT REP.
578 (1991); Eugene N. Lisitsyn, Environmental Law and Management in the USSR: A Reflection on
ContemporaryReforms, 17 REv. SOCIALIST L. 125, 129-32 (1991).
9' Kirillova, supranote 94, at 584.
'" Kathleen M. Maloney-Dunn, Comment, Russia's Nuclear Waste Law: A Response to the Legacy of
Environmental Abuse in the FormerSoviet Union, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 365, 384 (1993).
97 Law on Underground Resources, No. 2395-1, Feb. 21, 1992, ECONOMIC LAW OF RUSSIA,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File. For discussion of this law, see Kevin J. Vaughan,
Russia's Petroleum Industry: An Overview of Its Current Status, the Need for Foreign Investment, and
Recent Legislation, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 813, 828-831 (1994); Brian L. Zimbler, Russian Foreign
Investment and NaturalResources, 14 WHITrIER L. REV. 477, 484-491 (1993).
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conservation in the interests of the present and future generations of the
peoples of the Russian Federation.""8
The law authorizes the licensing of rights to explore for and produce
underground resources through auctions and tenders.99 The law
also
imposes a system of payments for the use of non-continental
shelf
underground resources.' 00 Failure to comply with this law subjects
the
violator to criminal and administrative liability.'0 '
B.

Law on the ContinentalShelf

Russia enacted its federal Law on the Continental Shelf in 1995.102
The continental shelf is defined as "the sea bottom and bowels of
the
submarine areas outside the territorial sea of the Russian Federation . .
.
across the entire area of the natural extension of its dry land territory and
up
to the external boundary of the submarine outskirts of the continent."'0 3
The
continental shelf extends 200 nautical miles. 4 As expected, the
law
provides that the Russian Federation has the exclusive, sovereign right
to
prospect and develop its mineral and live resources on its continental
shelf.'0 5 The Federation also has "the exclusive right to permit and regulate
building, exploitation and use of artificial islands, installations
and
structures on the continental shelf."'0 6 Extraction of mineral resources
on
the continental shelf is subject to the authority of the Government of
the
Russian Federation. 7 The law creates a system of monetary payments
for
the use of mineral and live resources on the continental shelf.'0 8

Law on UndergroundResources, supranote 97, art. 35.
Id arts. 13, 17. For a description of the tender process, see Holton, supra
note 84, at 24.
too Law on UndergroundResources, supra note
97, arts. 39-43.
"01
Id. art. 49.
102
Law on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation,Federal
Law no. 187, Nov. 30, 1995,
ECONOMIC LAW OF RUSSIA, availablein LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW
File.
103
Id art. 1.
104

Id.

105

Id art. 5(2).

106

107

Id art. 5(3).
Id. art. 4.

]as

Id art. 40.
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Law on ProductionSharingAgreements'0 9

In December 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed into law
the Law on Production Sharing Agreements ("PSA"), effective on
publication January 11, 1996. i0 This law establishes the rights and
responsibilities of parties to production sharing contracts who are engaged

in the exploration, development, and production of Russia's mineral
wealth."' The law is intended to coexist with the Law on Underground
Resources to create a framework for oil and gas exploration.

The law is considered to be "one of the most significant legal
instruments of a major former socialist country in its journey towards an
envisaged market economy."' 12 Although the PSA Law is a landmark piece
of legislation which moves Russia's legal environment closer to
international standards for oil and gas development, the law has also been

109
Petroleum legislation providing for exploration and exploitation of energy resources is typically
divided into two types of legal arrangements: concessions and contracts. GORDON H. BARROWS,
WORLDWIDE CONCESSION CONTRACTS AND PETROLEUM LEGISLATION 1 (1983). Concessions, the most
widely used arrangement, are loosely defined as grants of specific rights and privileges by a government.
Id. at 4; ZHIGUO GAO, supra note 16, at 12. Examples of countries which use concessions include
Australia, the United States, and Thailand. Concessions differ from contracts in that concessions allocate
all production to the concessionaire while imposing correspondingly higher tax and royalty rates.
BARROWS, at 1. Contracts, on the other hand, allocate only some of the production to the contractor and
the rest to the host government. Id. Petroleum contracts come in three forms: the production sharing
contract, the risk service contract, and the pure service contract. Id. A production sharing contract, which
the Russian Federation employs, is defined as, "[A]n agreement under which a foreign company, serving as
a contractor to the host country/its national oil company, recovers its costs each year from production and
is further entitled to receive a certain share of the remaining production as payment in kind for the
exploration risks assumed and the development service performed if there is a commercial discovery."
ZHIGUO GAO, supra note 16, at 72.
Io The law was published in Ross. Gazeta, Jan. 11,1996. PSA Law, supra note 3. Prior to the
enactment of Russia's PSA Law, international oil companies had been granted rights to explore on Russia's
land and continental shelf by virtue of specifically enacted legislation which had been individually
negotiated. This ad hoc type of authorization to explore and exploit a country's natural wealth is not the
preferred type of authorization.
I
For in-depth analyses of the PSA Law, see Ernest Chung, Recent Development, Petroleum
Investment in the Russian Federation-RussianFederation Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing
Agreements, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 551 (1996); Scott C. Senecal & Elena L. Daly, Russia, INT'L FIN. L.R.,
Apr. 1996, at 40-44; Thomas W. Wkilde & Martin Friedrich, Russian Federation:Law on Production
Sharing Agreements, 35 I.L.M. 1251 (1996); Peter Houlder, New Law Favours Local Firms (Russia's Oil
Industry), PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1996, at 26; Peter B. Maggs, Russia'sNew ProductionSharing
Law Provides for Arbitration, But is Hampered by Politics, II MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 24 (1996);
David R. Nelson, Russia's Production Sharing Law--A Foundationfor Progress (Production Sharing
Agreementsfor Oil and Gas Leases), OIL & GAS J., Jan. 29, 1996, at 106.
12
Waelde & Friedrich, supra note 11, at 1251.
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Amendments to the PSA Law are currently being

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT

Offshore development activities, i.e., exploration, development and
production, can have a profound deleterious effect on the marine
environment." 5 Impacts include alteration of the seabed topography,
destruction of biota and their habitat, and damage to physical processes
necessary to management of the ecosystem. 16 Perhaps the most widely
known example of the potential environmental consequences of offshore oil
and gas development is the accident that occurred in 1969 off the coast of
Southern California. 1 7 There, on January 28, 1969, a well drilled from a
platform blew out." 8 The well was plugged eleven days later but not before
thousands of barrels of oil had spilled in the ocean and onto nearby
beaches." 9 The estimated total spillage was one to three million gallons of
oil, or 24,000 to 71,000 barrels.120 Significantly, the Santa Barbara oil spill
is widely recognized as the catalyst that prompted the U.S. Congress to pass
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969."2
The environmental risks inherent to offshore oil and gas development
include those resulting from oil spills as well as those from regular
operations. 22 Oil spills are typically the first image that comes to mind; and
See, e.g., Investors Criticize Russia's ProductionSharing Law, 7 INT'L TAX REV. 3 (1996).
Law on Amendments to the Federal Law on ProductionSharing Agreements (Draft),
RUSSIAN
PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Nov. 1996, at 72. See also Amendments and More Amendments, RUSSIAN
PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Nov. 1996, at 23.
'i5 For a full treatment of the environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas development, see
113
"4

LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT (Donald F. Boesch
&

Nancy N. Rabalais eds., 1987).
116
FILLMORE C. F. EARNEY, MARINE MINERAL RESOURCES 112 (1990).
17
See generally ROBERT EASTON, BLACK TIDE: THE SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL AND
ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1972). Other destructive blowouts include the North Sea Ekofisk Complex's Bravo

platform blowout in 1977 and the 1979 Gulf of Campeche's Ixtoc I blowout (off the Yucatan peninsula in
the Gulf of Mexico). The North Sea blowout lasted nine days, the Ixtoc blowout nine months. EARNEY,

supranote 116, at 267.
1s
WALTER J. MEAD ET AL., OFFSHORE LANDS: OIL AND GAS LEASING AND
CONSERVATION ON
THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 15 (1985)
119
Id
120 Id. at 15 n. 16. There are conflicting estimates of the total volume of oil spilled. The highest

estimate appears to be 3,300,300 gallons of oil spilled. EASTON, supra note 117, at 251.
121
MEAD, supra note 118, at 15.
in
Thomas A. Grigalunas & James J. Opaluch, The Environment, in MANAGING
THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS: OCEANS OF CONTROVERSY 60 (R. Scott Farrow ed., 1990).
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yet, these types of incidents are rare. Far more common are the daily small
accidental spills and intentional discharges. I"3
The main marine pollutants from oil and gas development are:
halogenated hydrocarbons, petroleum and its derivatives, other organic
chemicals, nutrient chemicals, inorganic chemicals, suspended solids,
radioactive substances, and thermal waste.'24 The risk associated with
exposure to these pollutants is a function of their toxicity. 25 Noise
126
pollution also impacts marine environs.
Offshore oil and gas development poses risks to ecological interests,
commercial interests, and social interests. Exposure to crude oil at sublethal
concentrations can significantly affect the behavior and development of
marine organisms.2 7 For example, among higher organisms respiration,
burrowing, feeding, and reproductive activities are altered. 28 The ultimate
impact of exposure depends on the nature and extent of the contaminated
area, the species, and the dependence of the organism on the impacted
area. 129

Besides impacting marine life, whole ecosystems may also suffer
from contact with marine pollutants. Long-term effects include residual
.contamination and slow recovery of damaged biota. 30 In addition, oil and
gas operations may result in physical habitat alterations.' 3'

123
Jerry M. Neff et al., Offshore Oil and Gas Development Activities Potentially Causing LongTerm Environmental Effects, in LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, supra note 115, at 149.
124
GAVOUNELI, supra note 16, at 34.
125
JOHN C. REIS, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL IN PETROLEUM ENGINEERING 4 (1996). Toxicity is

measured as the pollutant's concentration in water that results in the death of half of the exposed organisms
within a given length of time. Id.
127

Id. at 127.
Id. at 89.

12S

ld One study of the impact of spilled crude oil on Pacific herring revealed that exposure to oil

126

significantly increased the frequency of abnormal larvae including spinal deformities. Id at 90. For a
discussion of impacts on marine mammals, see Joseph R. Geraci & David J. St. Aubin, Effects of Offshore
Oil and Gas Developments on Marine Mammals and Turtles, in LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS,
supra note 115, at 587..
29
Donald F. Boesch et al., An Assessment of the Long-Term Environmental Effects of US.
Offshore Oil and Gas Development Activities: Future Research Needs, in LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS, supra note 115, at 16. The animals most threatened by crude oil are those which rely on their fur
or feathers for thermal insulation. Id. at 17. Oil coated fur or feathers do not repel water or act as thermal
insulators. REIS, supra note 125, at 91. The exposed animals or birds are then susceptible to drowning and
hypothermia. Id. Marine wildlife that inhale or ingest petroleum vapors may also experience respiratory
problems. Boesch et al., at 18. Turtles are particularly threatened by this type of exposure; tar gets caught
in their mouths which then impedes their ability to eat. Id.
130
Boesch et al., supra note 129, at 21.
11

Id. at 25.
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Commercial interests threatened by offshore oil and gas development
include financial losses to commercial fishermen resulting from damage to
the fish stock and to fishing gear from contact with oil and gas-related
obstructions or debris. 32 Oil and gas development may have long-term
effects on fisheries in three ways. First, species that reproduce near the
water surface may suffer if an oil spill occurs at the same time as the
gestation period. 33 Second, the effects of chronic releases of toxic
petroleum compounds on the juveniles and adults of species which are
found on or near the bottom of the sea is similarly catastrophic. 34 Third,
physical destruction or alteration of critical habitats from an oil spill
threatens the mortality of fisheries.' 35
Finally, public health may be jeopardized by offshore oil and gas
activities. Human exposure to toxic contaminants may occur through
ingestion, inhalation, or skin contact. 136 Acute effects from exposure
through the ingestion of seafood include irritation to the mouth, throat and
stomach, digestive disorders, and respiratory problems. 37 Chronic exposure
to petroleum derivatives may harm kidneys, livers, and the gastrointestinal
38
tract.
A.

Environmental Impacts in Russia

First
experienced
their energy
of Japan is

132
1
134

135
136

137

the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, has
catastrophic environmental damage from the development of
resources. A January 1997 Russian tanker accident in the Sea
but one example. 39 Oil spills take place with "disastrous

Grigalunas & Opaluch, supra note 122, at.62.
Boesch et al., supra note 129, at 19:
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
REIS, supra note 125, at 94.

Id. at 94-95.

138 Id at 95.
139
Teresa Watanabe, Oil Spill Threatens Fish, Future of Japanese Town, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1997, at Al. On Jan. 2, 1997, an estimated 962,000 gallons of oil spilled into the Sea of Japan when
a Russian tanker split apart. Id. The spill has threatened an endangered species of bird, a nuclear power
plant, and 100 km of Japan's coastline. Oil Spill Threatens Rare Bird, GREENWIRE, Jan. 23, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Envim Library, GRNWRE File; Oil Spill Threatens Nuclear Power Plant,
GREENWiRE, Jan. 13, 1997, available in LEXIS, Envim Library, GRNVWRE File; Oilfrom a Russian Crude
Tanker that Sank in the Sea ofJapan has Hit the JapaneseCoast Affecting the Main Island of Honshu,
OGJ Newsletters (OIL & GAS J.), Jan. 13, 1997, at 4.
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frequency" in the oil and gas fields and pipelines of western Siberia. 4 '
Aleksei Yablokov, Chairman of the Russian Security Council's
Interdepartmental Commission for Environmental Safety, estimated the
annual number of major spills to be around 700.141 Western estimates are
considerably higher-40,000 accidents each year. 42 These spills not only
occur frequently, they tend to be of significant magnitude. A 1994 spill in
the Komi Republic spewed at least two million barrels of oil onto the fragile
Arctic tundra-nearly eight times the amount of the Exxon Valdez crude oil
spill in Alaska in 1989. 4 1 Oil spills in these northern latitudes are
particularly damaging because rates of biological activity decrease making
144
an ecosystem's recovery much slower.
Gas leaks, although less frequent, appear no less damaging. Methane
emissions exert a strong impact on global warming. 14' Twenty-eight
percent of all the methane accidentally released from oil and gas
productions in the world is released in Russia. 46 Methane is lost through
leaks in the production, processing, transmission, storage and distribution
processes.' 47 In a dramatic example of a methane release, a gas leak in a
pipeline near Ukhta, about 800 miles northeast of Moscow, created a 25,000
foot high "fireball.
These frequent spills and leaks are caused by poor field practices and
an out-dated and dilapidated infrastructure. 149 The International Energy
Agency reported that approximately twenty-three percent of the accidents
were the result of poor construction work, sixteen percent due to external
corrosion, and thirteen percent because of stress erosion. 50 Refurbishment
of existing natural gas pipelines and compressor stations has been
140
Anna Scherbakova & Scott Monroe, The Urals and Siberia, in ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
AND CONSTRAINTS, supra note 24, at 69.
141
Russia Counts the Cost of Pipeline Ruptures as New Spill Hits Komi, EAST EUR. ENERGY

REPORT, Feb. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, EEENR File.
142
Russia's Debilitated Energy Lifelines, PLANECON REPORT, May 2, 1995, at 1.
143
Matthew J. Sagers, Oil Pipeline Ruptures in Komi Republic: Magnitude and Potential Impact,
35 POST-SOVIET GEOGRAPHY 431 (1994).
I"
PHILIP R. PRYDE, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION 203 (1991).
145
Thomas Land, Russia Steps On the Gas Leaks: Russia's Accident Prone Pipeline System is

Blamed for the World's Highest Rate of Methane Emissions, LLOYD'S LIST, May 16, 1996, available in
1996 WL 6708487.
146
Id.
147

Id

148

Russia's DebilitatedEnergy Lifelines, supra note 142, at 1.

149

DANIEL YERGIN & THANE GUSTAFSON, RUSSIA 2010 AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WORLD

278 (1993).
ISo

INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 170 (1995).
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characterized as the most immediate problem for the Russian gas pipeline
system.151 Twenty-eight thousand kilometers, or twenty percent of Russia's
pipelines, need to be immediately replaced. 52 Given the frequency with
which Soviet/Russian infrastructure has failed in the past, combined with
the slow rate of environmental recovery due to Russia's northerly location,
environmental regulation of the offshore oil and gas industry warrants
special attention.
VI.

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT

To illustrate the uniqueness of Russia's regulatory regime, this
section first briefly considers the spectrum of other petroleum producing
countries' efforts to regulate the environmental impact of offshore activities.
It then turns to Russians' constitutional and statutory rights with respect to
the environment. How those rights are purportedly protected where
offshore development activities impact the marine environment is
considered by looking at investors' environmental obligations at each stage
of a project.
A.

The Spectrum of EnvironmentalRegulation

There is a broad spectrum in how rigorously countries regulate
offshore development activities. At one end of the spectrum are those
countries that place few environmental duties on investors, such as
Thailand. At the other end are countries that systematically and rigorously
regulate each stage of offshore development, such as the United States.
. Thailand is representative of countries with relatively lax
environmental regulation. The underdeveloped nature of its regulatory
system is reflected in the terms of its petroleum concession system."'
Thailand's Petroleum Act generally provides "the concessionaire shall take
appropriate measures in accordance with good petroleum industry practice
to prevent pollution in any place by oil, mud or any other substance."' 54 No
reference is made to duties under national environmental legislation. In the
1'

152

Sagers, supra note 59, at 55 1.

Id

153
ZHIGUO GAO, supra note 16, at 49. Thailand uses a concession contract when authorizing a
foreign company to explore and exploit its resources on the continental shelf. Id at 29.
"4
1971 Petroleum Act § 75, GOV'T GAZETTE, SPECIAL ISSUE, Apr. 23, 1971, at 43 quoted
in
ZHI-GUO GAO, supranote 16, at 49.
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event of a pollution discharge, the contract requires investors to "take
immediate action to combat such pollution."' 55 The Thai regulatory
structure is considered one of the least protective among petroleumproducing countries. "In short, international oil companies in Thailand have
156
been operating under no real obligation to protect the environment."'
Representative of the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum is the
system operating in the United States. Given the complexity of the U.S.
regime, discussion of relevant U.S. legislation is included throughout the
following discussion.
B.

Constitutional& Statutory Rights

The Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted by national
referendum on December 12, 1993, guarantees the right to a healthy
environment as well as judicial recourse if one's rights have been violated.
Article 42 specifically provides a constitutional right with respect to the
environment, "Everyone shall have the right to [a] favourable environment,
reliable information about its state and for a restitution of damage inflicted
on his health and property by ecological transgressions."' 57 The Federal
Law on the Protection of the Natural Environment further guarantees
individuals the "right to the protection of their health from the unfavorable
impact of the natural environment caused by economic or any other
activity."1 58 In the event an individual's right to a favorable environment or
to protection of an individual's health is violated, both the Constitution and
the Law on Protection of the Natural Environment provide for
compensation through judicial and/or administrative relief.' 59 In contrast to
155

Id.

ZHIGUO GAO, supra note 16, at 50.
KONST. RF, supranote 27, art. 42.
158 Law ofthe Russian Federationon the Protection ofthe NaturalEnvironment (with Amendments
of Feb. 21, 1992 and June 2, 1993), ECONOMIC LAW OF RUSSIA, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLAW File [hereinafter Law on Environmental Protection]. This law acts as the basic umbrella law
156

157

providing broad goals and principles for environmental protection in the Russian Federation. For lengthy
analyses of this law, see Alex Dehgan, A Criticism of the New Mechanismsfor Environmental Protectionin
the Russian Federation, 19 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 661 (1993); Andrew R. Bond & Matthew J. Sagers,
Some Observations on the Russian Federation Environmental Protection Law, 33 POST-SOVIET
GEOGRAPHY 463 (1992).
"s9
"Everyone shall be guaranteed judicial protection of his rights and freedoms." KONST. RF,

supra note 27, art. 46. "This right shall be guaranteed.., by the compensation in judicial or administrative
proceedings of the harm inflicted on the health of individuals as a result of the pollution of the natural
environment." Law on Environmental Protection,supranote 158, art. 11.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 6, No. 3

the Russian Federation, few countries' constitutions provide such a right.' 61
As the following discussion reveals, Russians' constitutional and statutory
rights are not likely to be realized under existing environmental law

regulating the offshore oil and gas industry.
C.

EnvironmentalDuties at the Pre-ContractStage

In Russia, the first stage of an offshore project is the solicitation of
bids and the awarding of contracts. It is at this stage when most
environmental duties are imposed on an investor. An investor's primary
duty is to complete an environmental impact assessment which is then
submitted to a state ecological commission for evaluation and approval.
1.

When EcologicalExaminationsAre Required
The federal Law on the Continental Shelf provides that before the

execution of federal "strategy, programmes, and plans," an authorized
federal body is to carry out a "state ecological expert examination," i.e., an
environmental impact assessment. 16 1 Where an oil or gas project is financed
62
by foreign investors, these examinations are specifically required.1

The primary principle which guides the ecological examination
process is the presumption of the potential ecological danger of any
activity. 163 Other principles which guide the process include: (1) the
ecological examination shall be conducted prior to the decision to begin a
project; (2) the evaluation is comprehensive, reliable and complete; (3)

those conducting the examinations are independent, and their opinions are
160
Yu. S. Shemshuchenko, Chelovyek i yevo pravo na byezapasnuyu (zdorovuyu)
okruzhaiushchuyu sredu, 10 Gos. i PRAvo 120 (1993) (surveying countries where constitutional
environmental rights are enjoyed).
161
Law on the Continental Shelf supra note 102, art. 31.
162 State Ecological Expert Examinations of Enterprises with Foreign Investments. RF Ministry of

Environmental and Natural Resource Protection Letter No. 01-12/65-1571, RUSDATA DIALINERUSLEGISLINE, May 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, RUSLEG File. This requirement is
similar to the U.S. requirement to conduct an environmental impact statement at the lease sale stage.
Secretary of Interior v. Califomia, 464 U.S. 312, 338 (1984) (interpreting the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA) and concluding that OCSLA and NEPA are compatible).
163
Law on Ecological Examinations, No. 174-FZ, RUSDATA DIALINE-RUSLEGISLINE, Nov. 23,
1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, RUSLEG File. On November 25, 1995, the RF Law on
EcologicalExaminations replaced a general clarification letter on environmental impact assessments from
the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources. Developments in Environmental Protection Regime, EAST
EUR. Bus. L., July 1996, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EEBLAW File.
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scientifically valid and objective; and, (4) public opinion is taken into
consideration. "
The ecological examination requirement applies to both public and
private projects where the project may have "a pernicious influence on the
natural environment."' 165 Mandatory state examinations are to precede "the
66
making of a commercial decision" or prior to issuance of a license.
Because the Law on Ecological Examinations is aimed at realizing the
constitutional right of citizens to a healthy environment, 167 a project is to be
authorized only after an ecological commission's positive conclusion that
the project is environmentally compatible. 6 This differs from the U.S.
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") required under the National
Environmental Policy Act 169 ("NEPA") in that Russia's impact assessment
requirement is not intended to be merely procedural.'
Whether realization
of a proposed energy project is prevented based on an ecological
commission's disapproval remains to be seen.
2.

EcologicalExaminations: Process & Evaluation

To obtain ecological approval, an investor must prepare and submit
documents establishing the environmental impact of the proposed project as
well as its compatibility with the environment. Although federal, regional,
and local governments have authority to conduct ecological examinations,
proposed activities on the continental shelf are under exclusive federal
jurisdiction.' 7' The State Committee for Environmental Protection 172 creates
'

Law on Ecological Examinations, supra note 163, art. 3.

165

Law on Environmental Protection, supra note 158, art. 36.1.

In the United States, an

environmental impact statement is required for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1996).
166
Law on Environmental Protection, supra note 158, art. 36-37.
167
Law on Ecological Examinations, supra note 163, preface.
168 Law on Environmental Protection, supra note 158, art. 36.2.
142 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
170
The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the requirement that an EIS be completed for every "major
federal action significantly affecting the natural environment" does not impose substantive duties
mandating particular results, "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978).
171
Law on the Continental Shelf supra note 102, art. 6.
172
By Presidential decree, the federal Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources ("MNER')
was abolished and in its place acts the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Environmental
Protection and the Ministry of Natural Resources. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No.
1177 of Aug. 14, 1996 on the Structure of the Federal Bodies of Executive Power (with Additions and
Amendments of Aug. 22, Sept. 6, Nov. 29, 1996), ECONOMIC LAW OF RUSSIA, Sept. 6, 1996, available in
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a commission of experts and authorizes the commission to conduct the
evaluation. 7 3 These commissions have the authority to demand all
necessary information from governmental and private sources.' 74
State ecological commissions are comprised of outside experts and
staff members of the federal and regional State Committee on
Environmental Protection. 175 An "expert" is a "specialist who has scientific
and/or practical knowledge in the field in question."'176 Representatives of
investors or their contracting parties are prohibited from participating in the
evaluation process. 177 Given Russia's loose guidelines by which these
commissions are created, as well as the apparent power to disapprove a
project, membership on these commissions could be subject to corruption.
The commission has four months within which to evaluate the
proposed project and issue its decision. 178 Assuming two-thirds of the
commission approves the project, 179 the State Committee on Environmental
Protection will confirm the commission's decision and the investor may
begin the project.' 0 If over one-third of the commission rejects the project,
however, additional experts are invited to consider the project for two more
months.' 81 Head of the former ministry's State Environmental Evaluation
Department, Gennady Chegasov, noted, "This provision eliminates the
possibility of leaving the project suspended without decision, be it positive
or negative."'8 2 If a negative evaluation is again issued, the project is
rejected but additional documents may be submitted provided they address
the concerns stated in the initial evaluation. 3 Information on the results of
the state ecological expert examination is to be made available to interested

LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File. Throughout this Comment, the State Committee for Environmental
Protection is used in place of the MNER.

Law on Ecological Examinations,supranote 163, art. 14.5.
Statute of Rules for Performing State Ecological Expert Examination, RF Government Decree
RUSDATA DIALINE-RUSLEGISLINE, June 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
File [hereinafter State EcologicalExaminationRegulations].
Law on Ecological Examinations,supra note 163, art. 15.
Id. art. 16.1.
Id.art. 16.2.
State Ecological ExaminationRegulations, supra note 174, art. 7.
Id art. 19.
ISO Id art. 23.
I"' Id.
192 Two Down, Five to Go, RUSSIAN PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Oct. 1996, at 67.
13
State Ecological ExaminationRegulations, supra note 174, art. 28.

173
174
No. 698,
RUSLEG
17
176
177
178
179
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organizations. 8 4 It is not clear whether the ecological opinion itself is to be
made available to all interested parties.
The criteria upon which an evaluation is based are: (1) whether the
planned activity conforms with environmental laws; (2) the environmental
impact of the planned activity and whether compatibility with the
environment is substantiated; and, (3) the adequacy of preventative
measures.' 85 Prior to the issuance of these regulations, few oil and gas
project proposals were approved on the first submission because of the lack
of guidelines for applicants. 86 After reviewing more than 100 energy
projects in four years, Chegasov recalls he "could not remember a single
case in which potential investors faced no problems at all in obtaining the
coveted stamp of approval. 8 7 In October 1996, the Chairman of the State
Duma Committee for Ecology, Tamara Zlotnikova, admitted of the
ecological approval process, "Currently, this process is essentially arbitrary.
Investors must redo ecological impact studies several times to obtain
188
government approval, resulting in numerous delays and high costs.'
Unfortunately, the criteria in the June 1996 regulation remain ambiguous in
that they identify broad categories but no definitive standards.
3.

Public Participationin the EcologicalEvaluationProcess

Unlike in Russia where the mineral developer has the affirmative
duty to prepare an impact assessment which is then subject to state
approval, in the U.S. federal agencies are the entities that must complete
EISs. 89 This aspect of the EIS requirement is considered a hallmark of
NEPA in that the EIS serves the function of full disclosure of all possible
effects to the general public, other governmental entities, and other persons
within the leasing agency.' 90
Full-disclosure, however, appears not to be a primary objective of the
state ecological examination in Russia, although there are a few provisions
I" Law on Ecological Examinations, supra note 163, arts. 7, 8; State Ecological Examination
Regulations,supra note 174, art. 27.
35 State EcologicalExamination Regulations, supranote 174, art. 15.
1
Filling in the Blanks, RUSSIAN PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Oct. 1996, at 66-67.
187
Id at 68.
28 Id at 66-67.
19

EISs are then reviewed by another agency, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), to

ensure NEPA compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (1996).
190 Environmental Defense Fund v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1972), vacated342 F. Supp 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
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to encourage public participation in the decision-making process. Citizens
and public interest environmental organizations may submit "well-argu[ed]
proposals concerning the ecological aspects of the planned activities."''
The commission is obligated to "study" the materials submitted by the
public.'9 2 The public may "take other actions in the field of ecological
examination which are not contrary to legislation of the Russian
Federation."' 93 This provision leaves open the possibility of the public
commenting on draft evaluations, provided those evaluations are made
available. Because there is no requirement to issue a draft evaluation for
public comment, however, this opportunity seems unlikely. The public may
also obtain information on results of the ecological examination. 94
Whether this provision means the completed evaluation is to be made
publicly available is unclear. Finally, representatives of public interest
organizations may participate in commission sessions as "observers."' 95
Public ecological expert examinations may be conducted by public
interest environmental organizations at their initiative and expense provided
implementation of the proposed project would affect the interests of the
population.' 96 These organizations have the right to obtain the documents
submitted by the investor for state evaluation. 97 Members of public
commissions are held to the same standards as state commissions.'"
Public interest organizations are precluded from conducting a public
ecological expert examination where information on the planned activity
constitutes a "state, commercial or other secret protected by law."' 199 How
inclusive is the concept of "commercial" secret is not indicated. A broad
interpretation of all three types of secrets would hinder public participation.
The evaluation generated from the public ecological expert
examination must be sent to the State Committee for Protection of the
Environment for confirmation as well as to the applicant, and to regional
191
Law on Ecological Examinations, supra note 163, art. 19.1. A "Directive on Guaranteeing
Public Participation in the State Ecological Evaluation" is pending as of April 1997. This directive is

intended to determine the rules by which public interest environmental organizations may participate in the
evaluation process. FederalMandate, RUSSIAN PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Oct. 1996, at 68.
192
Law on EcologicalExaminations,supra note 163, art. 19.2.
193
Id. art. 19.1.
194 Id.
195

Id. art. 22.3.

Law on Environmental Protection, supra note 158, art. 39; Law on Ecological
Examinations,
supra note 163, art. 19.1; art. 20.
197
Law on Ecological Examinations, supra note 163, art. 22.3.
19
Id art. 22.4.
199
Id art. 24.1.
196

JULY 1997

RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OFFSHORE

671

and local governments. 0 0 If the evaluation is confirmed, it has the legal
force of a state ecological expert examination. 20 ' The Committee, however,
has not been provided guidelines for confirmation. Unfortunately, the
highly technical (and expensive) nature of evaluating the impact of projects
on the continental shelf will likely preclude environmental organizations
from conducting independent evaluations.
Interestingly, the public
ecological evaluation may be published in the mass media,20 2 whereas there
is no provision for publication of the state ecological evaluation.
4.

Sanctions andAppeals

Investors are exposed to criminal liability if they fail to submit
documents for ecological examination or falsify the documents and such
violations result in grave direct or indirect ecological and other
consequences. 20 3 If not held criminally liable, a violator may be subject to
civil or administrative liability. 20 4 Individuals are also liable for failure to
comply with findings of the commissions, although whether this liability is
civil or criminal is unclear.20 5
Applicants, public organizations, and other "interested" persons may
appeal the decisions of the state ecological expert commissions in court.20 6
This provision provides a critical mechanism for judicial review of
commissions' decisions.
Once a project receives its stamp of approval, there appears to be no
mechanism for re-evaluating the decision in light of new scientific
information. Nor must an investor complete an additional assessment
before beginning exploration. In comparison, the U.S. Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") requires application of NEPA at the lease sale,
exploration, and development and production stages.2" 7 The leasing agency
200 Id. art. 25.1.
Id art. 25.2.
Id art. 25.4.
203 Id. arts. 30-3 1.
204 Id. arts. 32-34.
2o
Id art. 30.
206 State EcologicalExamination Regulations, supra note 174, art. 29.
207 Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1984).
203
202

In OCSLA, the U.S.

Congress asserted jurisdictional control and power of disposition over the subsoil and seabed of the outer
continental shelf. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1996). The coastal zone falls under coastal state jurisdiction by
virtue of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, as amended. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1996). According to OCSLA,

the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to lease for production federally-owned offshore fields to private
developers through competitive bidding. 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (1996).
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can issue a license before it produces a complete EIS, but the lessee's right
to begin developing oil and gas resources does not vest completely until
completion of a series of environmental analyses under NEPA.2 °8 Until that
point, the agency retains the authority to prevent subsequent exploration and
production until environmental problems are identified and resolved. °9 In
effect, a U.S. lease does not convey an absolute right to drill, produce or
2 10
sell.
D.

Duties During Exploration,Development & Production

Although no further ecological examinations are required once a PSA
has been signed, the production sharing contract and federal law place other
environmental duties on the mineral developer.
I.

Environmental ObligationsArising Out ofPSAs

As outlined in Part IV, the Law on Production Sharing Agreements
governs the contracts between the Russian Federation and international
petroleum companies for oil and gas development. The PSA Law creates
environmental obligations of petroleum investors by requiring certain
provisions to be addressed in every agreement.
A production sharing agreement must obligate the investor to "take
measures at preventing harmful impact of the said operations upon the
natural environment, as well as to remedy the consequences of such
impact. ' '211 As of April 1997, implementing regulations were in draft form
only.212 These regulations list issues that must be addressed in every
PSA.213 According to the draft PSA regulations, every PSA must address
the investor's commitments to "subsoil protection" and "environmental
protection. 2 4 A PSA must also address the investor's commitments to
"other subsoil requirements established by law. ' ' 2 5
Those "other"
203

Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d at 605.
Id.
Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 339 (1984).
211 PSA Law, supra note 3,art. 7.2.
212 Draft Regulation on the Procedure for Concluding, Implementing and Overseeing Production
Sharing Agreeements for Subsoil .Use art. 12, translated in,Enough Said, RUSSIAN PETROLEUM INVESTOR,
Nov. 1996, at 19 (hereinafter Draft PSA Regulations].
213 Down to the Nitty Gritty, RUSSIAN PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Nov. 1996, at 16.
214 Draft PSA Regulations art. 3, supra note 212, at 19.
215
Id.
209
210
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requirements which must be addressed include measures aimed at
preventing hazardous impact of operations.216 These provisions are vague,
providing the investor with no guidance as to its responsibilities and
potential liability. Additionally, these provisions also set no specific
standards by which to measure compliance.
Lessees in the U.S. have a general duty to maintain operations in
compliance with environmental regulations. 217 Offshore leases are
"somewhat" contingent upon environmental acceptability. 218 The Secretary
of Interior is authorized to cancel a lease for environmental reasons upon a
determination that: "(i) continued activity.. . would probably cause harm
to [the] environment; (ii) the threat of harm or damage will not disappear or
decrease to an acceptable extent within a reasonable period of time; and (iii)
the advantages of cancellation outweigh the advantages of continuing such
lease or permit in force. ''219 If a lease is canceled for these reasons, the
lessee is entitled to the fair value of the canceled right (including anticipated
revenues and costs of compliance). 2 In reality, the Secretary of Interior
has apparently never canceled a lease for environmental reasons, although
cancellations have been considered.22 '
In the exploration phase, a permit will be issued only if the Secretary
of Interior determines the exploration "will not be unduly harmful to aquatic
life in the area, result in pollution, create hazardous or unsafe conditions,
unreasonably interfere with other uses of the area, or disturb any site,
structure, or object of historical or archeological significance.
a.

22

Insurance

Besides fulfilling general contractual duties to protect the
environment, a mineral developer in Russia has a contractual duty to obtain
insurance.223 The PSA must obligate the investor to buy insurance against

217

Id.
43 U.S.C. § 1348(b)(2) (1997).

21

NATIONAL ACADEMCY OF SCIENCES, LAND USE PLANNING AND OIL AND GAS LEASING ON

216

ONSHORE FEDERAL LANDS 29 (1989) quoted in GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC

LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 572 (1993).
219
43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1997).
220
43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(C).
221
COGGINS ET AL., supra note 218, at 580.
222

43 U.S.C. § 1340(g)(3).

223

Ecological insurance is to be made available to enterprises, institutions, organizations and

individuals.

Law on Environmental Protection, supra note 158 art. 23.1.

For a discussion of the
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liability for damage caused by accidents harmfully impacting the natural
environment.2 24 The PSA Law's draft implementing regulation reaffirms
the inclusion of an insurance requirement against loss or damage as a result
of environmentally hazardous impacts. 225 This requirement poses a
substantial hardship for foreign investors in Russia because such insurance
is not likely to be readily available.226 In addition, no guidelines are
provided as to the scope of the required coverage. In this respect, Russia's
law resembles those of less-developed petroleum-producing countries.
The United States requires the presence of a responsible party who
can establish and maintain financial responsibility sufficient to satisfy
minimum liability requirements where facilities are used for drilling for or
producing oil and have "worst-case" oil spill discharge potential of more
than 1,000 barrels of oil. 22 7 Where facilities are in open ocean, responsible
parties must show evidence of financial responsibility of $35 million and
for facilities in inland waters such as bays and estuaries $10 million is the
required sum. 228 Financial responsibility may be established through a
showing of insurance, surety bond, guarantee, letter of credit, qualification
as a self-insurer, or other evidence of financial responsibility. 229
b.

Abandonment/Rehabilitation

The PSA Law requires a mineral developer to be contractually
obligated "to remove all facilities, installations and other assets upon
completion of the Agreement Operations as well as clean the territory on
which the Agreement Operations were conducted."23 This language is an
improvement over that found in the Law on the Continental Shelf which
only requires information about the removal of installations and structures
complexities of insurance in the offshore oil and gas industry, see KIRSTEN ROHRMAN, OFFSHORE
OIL AND

GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS: LAW AND INSURANCE
(1990).
224
PSA

Law art. 7.2, supra note 3. The Law on the Continental Shelf requires information
about
insurance to be included in a license or agreement. Law on the Continental Shelf,
supra note 102, art. 8.
225
Draft PSA Regulations art. 12, supra note 212, at 19.
226 Frank Erisman etal., C.LS.Mining Legislation, MINING
J.,
May 24, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Energy Library, MINJNL File.
227
228
229
230

33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1)(A) (1997).
33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1)(B).
33 U.S.C. § 2716(e).

PSA Law art. 7.2, supra note 3. After approximately forty years of use, platforms
should be

removed and wells plugged. Rehabilitation involves the restoration of a site to approximate
its natural state
prior to platform installation. ZHIGUO GAO, supranote 16, at 219.
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after project completion be included in production sharing agreements.23'
Unfortunately, the draft PSA regulations provide no more specifics; the
agreement need only address the investor's commitments to "other subsoil
requirements" established by law including "cleaning the aftermath. 232
Given the lack of specificity, it will be difficult to hold investors responsible
for damage inflicted due to poor abandonment procedures.
One provision which Russia addresses for the first time in the draft
regulations is that of an abandonment fund.233 The fund is to be used for
land reclamation "within the limits of the area of operations under the
agreement and the activities related to dismantling, abandoning, and
preserving equipment, structures, holds and field facilities. '"234 Further
details as to the source or scope of this fund are not provided.
c.

Reference to NationalLegislation

The effect of the vague contractual duties arising under PSAs is that
the agreements provide little substantive protection against offshore
development but create a great deal of uncertainty as to what actions
constitute compliance. What little environmental protection the PSA
provides arises from the provision that requires activities conducted under
the agreement be in accordance with Russian Federation law including laws
on "protection of the subsoil, natural environment and health of the
population. '235 By referring to national environmental legislation, this
requirement puts Russia well ahead of many petroleum-producing
countries.
2.

EnvironmentalObligationsArising Out of FederalStatute

As discussed in Part V, the exploration, development and production
of oil and gas resources involve discharge of effluents into marine waters.
Russia's system for regulating pollution from offshore platforms is woefully
inadequate. Contractual obligations create broad duties which the investor
must fulfill but offer inadequate protection against harmful impacts from
development activities.
231

232
233
234
235

Law on the Continental Shelf supra note 102, art. 8.
Draft PSA Regulations art. 3(a), supra note 212, at 19.
Id.art. 2 1.
Id
PSA Law art. 7, supranote 3.
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Rather than following the traditional command and control regulatory
scheme, Russia has created an elaborate system of environmentally-based
economic incentives.236 The "cornerstone" of this mechanism is a pollution
charge system. 237 Konstantin Gofman, Deputy Director of the Russian
Academy of Sciences' Institute for Market Studies, explained the
economically-based program for environmental protection, "Of all the
countries in the world, it is now Russia that has the most developed system
of pollution taxes. We have fees for taxes for most major types of air and
water pollution and for solid waste disposal. 238 One regional leader noted
that economic incentives, "are now the chief levers with respect to the
environment .... We are convincing managers that it is more profitable to
build purification plants than to pay into the [ecological] fund. 23
Environmental quality is measured using: (1) ambient standards
based on the Soviet-era maximum permissible concentrations ("MPC");
and, (2) source limits measured in maximum permitted discharges ("MPD")
for each specific pollutant for a given period.240 Much criticism exists of
the use of MPCs because limits are established on an individual facility
basis, rather than on a uniform regional basis. 24' That is, "standards of
maximally permissible releases and discharges of dangerous pollutants...
shall be fixed with due account of the facility's production capacity, the
data on mutagenic effect and other harmful consequences. '242 MPCs have
also been criticized because as long as charges are not sufficiently high they
provide an incentive to pollute rather than encouraging the adoption of
243
pollution control technology.
Pollution charges for discharging pollutants are established for
discharges within the MPCs as well as for discharges above set limits. 244
This differs from traditional Western regimes which tend to have
permissible levels of discharge and penalties assessed only once that level
236

Law on Environmental Protection,supra note 158, arts. 15-21.

237

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE ENVIRONMENT GOES TO MARKET: THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR POLLUTION CONTROL I1 1 (1994).

239
J. Andrew Hoerner, Russia Seeks to Harness Market Forces to Clean Up Environment,
Choosing Taxes Over Regulation, TAX NOTES INT'L, May 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNI File.
239
Chelyabinsk Ecology Chief on 1992 Reforms, CHELYABINSKII RABOCHII, Mar. 27, 1993,
at 2,
translatedin F.B.I.S., FBIS-USR-059, May 12, 1993, at 36.
240

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, supra note 237, at 88.

241

Dehgan, supra note 158, at 685.
Law on Environmental Protection,supra note 158, art. 27.1.
Bond & Sagers, supra note 158, at 466.
Law on Environmental Protection,supra note 158, art. 20.3.

242
243
244
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has been exceeded.245 Charges are to be established "with due account of
ecological factors, namely, natural and climatic specifics of territories, and
importance of natural and socio-cultural objects., 246 Approximately 140
pollutants are identified, including petroleum, using coefficients indexed to
the particular body of water.247 Pollution charges may be capped, however,
"with due account of the economic specifics of the individual sectors of the
Given both the historical and contemporary
national economy." 248
importance of the oil and gas sector to the national economy, economic
priorities will likely continue to trump considerations of ecological
sensitivity.
Enterprises are generally required to report their own pollution
levels. 249 This absence of an actual monitoring system is a distinguishing
feature of Russia's pollution charge system which hinders its
effectiveness.2 ° The lack of effective monitoring is due to a lack of funds,
qualified personnel, and appropriate equipment.25'
Once the data has been submitted, the State Committee for
Environmental Protection determines whether inspections are needed.252
Where development activities are taking place on the continental shelf, the
State Committee for Hydrometeorology is charged with conducting "regular
observations" of the condition of the marine environment and bottom
sediments.253
Charges are to be levied where hazardous effects on the environment
occur including "dumping of pollutants into surface and underground
bodies of water., 254 Ninety percent of revenues generated from the charges
are allocated to "special accounts of off-budget ecological funds," and ten
Kingston, supra note 15.
246 Procedurefor Fixing and Capping of Chargesfor Environmental Pollution, Waste Dumping,
and Other Harmful Effects-RF Government Decree No. 632, RUSDATA DIALINE - RUSLEGISLINE, Aug.
28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, RUSLEG File.
247 Basic Norms of Payment for Exhausts, Drops of Pollutants into Environment and Waste
Disposal,ECONOMIC LAW OF RUSSIA, Nov. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File.
Coefficients are adjusted annually. See, e.g., Letter of the State Tax Service of the Russian Federation No.
NP-4-04/2N of Jn. 5, 1996 on Indexation of Payment for Environmental Pollution in 1996, ECONOMIC
LAW OF RUSSIA, Jan. 5, 1996, availablein LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File.
245

243

Id.

249
250

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, supranote 237, at 93.
Id.at 102.

251

Id.

Id.at 93.
Law on the ContinentalShelf, supra note 102, art. 33.
254 Environmental Pollution Charges: RF State Tax Service Letter No. IL-4-02/60N, RUSDATA
252
253

DIALNE-RUSLEGISLINE, Sept. 28, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Europe Library, RUSLEG File.
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percent to the federal fund to finance environmental protection activities.255
Of particular interest is that payment of charges does not relieve the polluter
from liability. 5 6
In contrast to Russia's statutory framework, statutory duties of
petroleum companies operating facilities off U.S. coasts are less diverse.
As mentioned in Part IV, the 1969 Santa Barbara, California blowout
proved to be the turning point in U.S. environmental regulation of offshore
oil and gas development activities. Discharges of effluents from offshore
installations on the continental shelf of the U.S. are regulated by the Clean
Water Act 257 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.258 All "harmful" quantities
of oil discharged into federal waters are prohibited unless specifically
permitted by the EPA under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES"). 219 The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has
produced a series of guidelines for discharge of pollutants from offshore
installations.26 °
One key aspect of U.S. regulation of offshore pollution which Russia
lacks is the requirement of spill prevention and response plans. First, the
Clean Water Act requires a National Contingency Plan and National
Response System.26' In addition, operators of offshore facilities must
prepare written Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure ("SPCC")
plans.262 And finally, any offshore facility located where one could
reasonably expect it to cause substantial harm to the environment by
discharging into the waters of the United States is required to prepare
individual response plans to address the removal of "worst case discharge"
or a "substantial threat of such a discharge of oil or hazardous substance. 263

235
256

Id. art. 9.
Id art. 10.

257 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1997).
259 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2767 (1997).

259 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
260 Effluent Guidelines and Standards, Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category, Offshore
Subcateory, 40 C.F.R. § 435.10, as amended61 Fed.Reg. 69366 (1997).
26! 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(d), 0) (1997).
262 40 C.F.R. §§ 112.3; 112.7 (1997). "The SPCC Plan shall be a carefully thought-out plan,
prepared in accordance with good engineering practices, and which has the full approval of management at
a level with authority to commit the necessary resources." 40 C.F.R. §§ 112.7. A registered professional
engineer must certify that the plan has been prepared in accordance with sound engineering principles. 40
C.F.R. § 112.3(d).
263 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5). Regulations delineate the scope and content of these
plans. Facility
Response Plans, 40 C.F.R. § 112.20 (1997).
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EnvironmentalLiability Issues

The above regulatory framework for Russia sets forth sweeping
affirmative duties but provides little guidance as to the scope of these
duties. As a result, companies operating in Russia's offshore oil and gas
industry must often speculate as to the appropriate level of compliance,
"Uncertainty surrounds attempts to assess and quantify environmental
liability risks.''264 A recent World Bank report indicates that the top 1000
multinational firms rank the uncertainty of environmental liability as one of
the top disincentives to invest in transitional economies. 265 The reason for
the concern is that these ambiguities leave much room for arbitrary
decisions of low-paid bureaucrats. The following discussion outlines the
types of environmental liability investors face under Russian federal law.
The PSA law provides for civil liability in the event that a party fails
to fulfill or improperly fulfills its contractual obligations.266 Under federal
environmental law, investors may incur civil, administrative, and criminal
liability. 267 Enterprises, institutions, organizations, and individuals who
270
268
harm public health, 269 or damage property
damage the environment,
may be held liable for compensation to damaged parties.27' In addition, all
entities may be subject to broad administrative liability for violation of
environmental laws including non-fulfillment of duties of carrying out state
ecological expert examinations and polluting the natural environment.272
Administrative fines depend on the nature of the violation, the degree of
guilt of the law breaker,273 and the damage caused.274
264

Administrative

Managing Environmental Risks in Central and Eastern Europe, E. EUR. BUS. L., Oct. 1994,

available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EEBLAW File.
265

JONATHAN

KLAVENS

&

ANTHONY

ZAMPARUTrI,

FOREIGN

DIRECT

INVESTMENT

AND

ENVIRONMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: A SURVEY 3 (1995).
266 PSA Law, supra note 3, art. 20.1.
267 Law on Environmental Protection, supra note 158, art. 81.

2"

Id. art. 86.

269
270

Id. art. 89.
Id. art. 90.

271

Unlike in Russia, civil penalties in the U.S. are capped at $25,000 per day of violation or an

amount of up to $1,000 per barrel of oil or unit of reportable quantity of hazardous substances discharged
is imposed. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A). The amount is increased to $100,000 per day and $3,000 per
barrel or unit of reportable quantity where there is proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D).
272
Law on Environmental Protection, supra note 158, art. 84.
273
Presumably, this language allows for consideration of egregious or intentional violations.
274
Law on Environmental Protection, supra note 158, art. 84.2. Unauthorized discharges of oil
and hazardous substances in U.S. waters, and owners and operators of facilities who do not comply with
the regulations are subject to two administrative penalty regimes: either up to $10,000 per day where an
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penalties may be appealed in court.2 7 5 Officials and private persons can be
held criminally liable for committing "socially dangerous deeds
encroaching on the ecological law and order ... , the society's ecological
safety, and causing harm to the natural environment and human health. 276
And finally, an action for injunctive relief may be maintained by
enterprises, institutions, organizations, and individuals where an activity
caused injury to human health, property, the national economy, or the
natural environment.2 77
It appears that removal liability is not
contemplated, i.e., mineral developers are not liable for costs associated
27
with cleaning up after a spill.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Environmental regulation of Russia's offshore oil and gas industry
appears to be relatively advanced. Lacking, however, are substantive
guidelines by which to shape behavior and measure compliance.
Implementing regulations intended to clarify general statutory duties further
cloud the regulatory environment. The International Energy Agency
concluded that the issue of energy-related environmental impacts "does not
figure large" in the Russian energy strategy. 279 As one commentator
characterized the situation, "The energy sector in the former Soviet Union
has never had to concern itself with meaningful environmental
requirements."2" ° The inefficacy of this regulatory framework has a dual
negative effect. First, it fails to adequately protect the environment and so it
fails to effectuate Russians' constitutional right to a favorable environment.
Second, it adds an additional degree of uncertainty as to potential liability
for international petroleum companies in an already risky investment
climate.
administrative process is streamlined or $125,000 may be assessed where formal adjudicatory proceedings
are followed; the public has an opportunity to participate in both types of proceedings. 33 U.S.C. §
1319(g)(2)(B) (1997).
275
Law on Environmental Protection,supra note 158, art. 84.3.
276
Id art. 85. In the U.S., criminal sanctions are imposed for failure to report discharges. 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1997). Civil and criminal penalties are paid into the Oil Liability Trust Fund. 26
U.S.C. § 9509 (1997).
277
Law on Environmental Protection,supra note 158, art. 9 1.
273 In contrast, the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA") established a regime for removal
liability, damages, and penalties. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1997). Responsible parties are strictly liable
for all removal costs and damages associated with the discharge. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
279
INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supranote 150, at 77.
280 Gerald Karey, Regulation andthe Environment, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Sept. 18, 1995, at 3.
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In spite of the legal risks, the potential energy reserves in the Russian
Far East, and in all of Russia, are too substantial for international petroleum
companies to ignore. Daniel Yergin, oil historian and author of the Pulitzerprize winning book The Prize: The Quest for Oil, Money & Power,
commented on the long-term investment prospects for the oil and gas
industry of the former Soviet Union, "It's the new prize for world oil, the
biggest risk is the risk of not being there. 28' When that urgency is
combined with the potential to capture the burgeoning energy markets of
Northeast Asia, the likelihood of offshore oil and gas development over the
long-term is good. Part of that package, however, is that investors must
contend with Russia's environmental protection legislation which imposes
both contractual and statutory duties. Slowly, legislative reform is creating
opportunities to hold private actors accountable for their actions. "At the
mention of environmental issues, most of us in the oil industry instinctively
recoil, look down at our feet, shuffle them, and mutter something about it all
being very difficult. When the region in question is the former Soviet
Union, the mutterings are likely to be more uneasy and longer. '282 Given
the long-term potential of Russia's oil and gas industry, the prudent course
for international petroleum companies would be to self-regulate in the
interest of self-preservation. The environmental rule of law in Russia is
only going to mature.
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